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full advantage of existing models is reflected by the fact that studies
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for systematic risk tilts. This paper presents a portfolio analysis that
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innovative firms. We argue that both their strategic implementation
of Corporate Social Responsibility and the general growth in Socially
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positive abnormal returns of this portfolio. We account for the id-
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1 Introduction
Despite the recent economic crises, socially responsible investing (SRI) has
been strikingly resilient and not merely a caprice of prosperous economic
times. SRI describes an investment strategy that accounts for environmen-
tal, social, and governance factors (ESG). Particularly in Europe, its expan-
sion in the last decade has been impressive: Whereas in 2002, the European
Sustainable Investment Forum reported 34 Bio Euro invested in so-called
core SRI, for 2009 the same organization documented investments of 1’200
Bio Euro (Eurosif, 2003, 2010). This reflects an annual growth rate of more
than 66%. The Sustainable Investment Forum for Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland estimates that from 2005 to 2009, SRI assets in mutual funds,
mandates, and other financial products have increased by roughly 29 per-
cent per year (FNG, 2011). In comparison, for the mature US market, the
Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment points out a 2.5% in-
crease in total assets managed under policies that incorporate ESG criteria
from 2001-2010, from 2’010 Bio to 2’512 Bio US Dollars. This stands in
contrast to US data from 1993-2001, when the same growth rate amounted
to 43% (US-Sif, 2010). Even discounting the fact that a fair amount of the
worldwide growth is attributable to bond investments and increasing asset
coverage, it is fair to assume that in Europe, SRI in equities has grown
substantially in the last decade, highlighting the economic importance for a
systematic understanding of the financial ramifications that SRI entails.
But how might SRI affect the financial performance of a firm? Although
conventional economic theory would roughly point to a negative association
(Friedman, 1970), recent and more pertinent descriptions of the phenomena
give reason to believe that there is something to be gained by SRI. Due to
its roots in principal-agent-theory, corporate governance is likely the most
established theoretical branch in this regard. The significance of corporate
governance in the context of shareholder and stakeholder value is discussed
thoroughly by Tirole (2001). Although the concept of stakeholder value - a
concept which incorporates many ESG factors - fares worse than shareholder
value on many levels (such as fuzzy tasking), it has conceptual advantages
as well. Biased decision-making in presence of negative externalities, for
instance, makes for one of the unintentional consequences of shareholder
value. From a more technical perspective, SRI has been associated with
a lack of optimal portfolio diversification for investors. Any restriction to
the market portfolio is said to edge away from the efficient frontier. Yet
Moskowitz (1972) counters that markets might fail to price value-relevant
ESG factors, leading to higher abnormal returns for corresponding firms. In
a seminal paper, Merton (1987) presents an asymmetric information model
in which investors overlook certain stocks. The smaller investor base is asso-
ciated with suboptimal risk sharing, yielding positive abnormal returns for
the stocks in question. In the next section, we take up this theoretical discus-
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sion; but ultimately, the question of whether SRI affects firm performance
negatively or positively remains an empirical one.
There is an established literature examining the empirical effect of SRI
on financial performance. Three methodologically distinct branches have
evolved: Regression analyses, event studies, and portfolio analyses. For-
merly a frequently used approach, simple regression analyses examine long-
term effects of ESG factors on financial performance. They are, however,
prone to omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Ambec and Lanoie
(2007) summarize the results of nine such studies and conclude that there
is limited evidence for a relationship.
In contrast, event studies mitigate the aforementioned caveats by fo-
cusing on a narrow time frame around an unexpected incident, say, an oil
spill or employment layoffs. This firm-specific announcement is assumed to
force a sudden reassessment of the firm’s value on the part of its investors.
In calculating abnormal returns within the specified time frame, significant
market reactions to the announcement can be deduced. Many studies indi-
cate substantial impacts on firm value from such incidents (Hamilton, 1995;
Dasgupta et al., 2001; Karpoff et al., 2005; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna,
2010; Linn, 2010). Although causally instructive, it remains unclear whether
the observed market reactions have a lasting effect on firm value and why
positive incidents often fail to show an impact.
Portfolio analyses, on the other hand, rely on a classic finance model
in order to calculate a fund’s long-term performance. Based on the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), the approach compares the abnormal returns
of SRI funds with appropriate benchmarks. Of the three research branches,
portfolio analyses currently constitute the most active one. Most studies
gather data from actively managed SRI funds (see Derwall et al. (2011)
for a comprehensive overview). So far, the empirical results are somewhat
mixed, but, at least for the US, lean towards one direction. Hardly any of
the studies indicate that SRI results in significant underperformance of the
corresponding funds. Most studies cannot reject the assumption of equal
performance. Indeed, some studies suggest that SRI funds fare better than
the market.
Although increasingly sophisticated, the current batch of portfolio anal-
yses reveals some drawbacks of its own. By arbitrarily lumping together
SRI funds that cater to different ESG priorities, specific ESG factors that
are linked to financial performance are bound to drown in the aggregate of a
myriad of non-relevant factors. In addition, the analysis of actively managed
funds might distort the effect of the specific ESG factors by virtue of the
portfolio managers’ skills, transaction costs, or in- and outflows of assets.
Most importantly, many studies disregard the risk tilts that are associated
with the idiosyncratic investment style of SRI. It has been repeatedly shown
that the risk factors introduced by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) explain substantial amounts of abnormal SRI fund returns (Bauer et
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al., 2005; Derwall et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2007). Neglecting these factors
bears the risk of false conclusions with respect to the effect of ESG factors
on financial performance.
As yet, there have only been comprehensive data on US risk factors,
which partly explains the heavy US focus of the literature. However, there
are good reasons to extend the field of research to Europe. Whereas in
the US, the SRI market has evolved and expanded in the past decades and
has settled somewhat by now, Europe is currently catching up (Bauer et al.,
2005). Striking growth rates support this view. We argue that these demand
shifts might be key in explaining abnormal financial performance. Europe
and the US differ in other relevant aspects as well. Cortez et al. (2012) stress
that there are geographical differences in the investment style of socially re-
sponsible funds. Data on market interest in nonfinancial information are
consistent with such distinct priorities. Eccles et al. (2011a) show that US
investors reveal a pronounced interest in governance data, while European
investors are disproportionately keen on environmental data. This seems
partly explainable by the fundamental differences in jurisdictions and polit-
ical agendas. Lundgren and Olsson (2010) provide an example for different
market reactions between the US and Europe using an event study: In Eu-
rope, environmental incidents are associated with a loss of value for the firm
in question, while results are not statistically significant for US firms. Last
but not least, extending the focus to European data meets the unanimous
advice for out-of-sample evidence (Bauer et al., 2007; Derwall et al., 2005,
2011).
This paper investigates how a distinct selection of small European growth
SRI firms fares in comparison to the market. In doing so, our portfolio
analysis follows up the existing branch of studies and contributes to the
literature by addressing the aforementioned problems along four dimensions.
First, we circumvent the distortion of an active portfolio management
and the problem of an indistinct focus of aggregated funds by analyzing
specialized firms selected by the sustainability research of the Zurich Can-
tonal Bank (ZKB). These firms, mainly small growth stocks with a focus
on strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) innovation, constitute
a ZKB internal universe from which the portfolio managers can pick. We
treat this pool as a synthetic portfolio and compare it to the market.
In our second contribution, we introduce an exhaustive risk-adjusted
portfolio analysis with European data. Comprehensive pan-European risk
factors, constructed by Schmidt et al. (2011), have enabled this application
study and account for the risk tilts that are rooted in the specific investment
style of our SRI portfolio.
Third, in addition to the established errors-in-expectations argument
for the explanation of positive abnormal returns, we discuss an overlooked
structural argument based on rising demand in the SRI market. Finally,
our results prompted us to go one step further and check the robustness of
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our estimates in new ways. Using a propensity score matching method, we
match our portfolio annually to all the firms in the market and construct
control portfolios with highly similar characteristics in terms of size, book-
to-market value, and momentum; key figures upon which the risk factors
are based. In addition, we account for country of origin and industry. To
our knowledge, this method has never been applied in a portfolio study in
combination with asset pricing models, introducing a novel technique to the
existing literature.
We find a robust financial outperformance for the analyzed portfolio
across different scenarios. In terms of the Carhart four-factor model, the
monthly outperformance amounts to 1.3%. Although there is reason to be-
lieve that some model misspecification is present due to the portfolio’s tilt
towards small and medium sized growth firms, the outperformance is re-
duced at most to 1% when adjusting for this issue. The rest of this paper
is structured as follows. The next section discusses our hypothesis that ad-
dresses the relationship between SRI and financial performance. In Section
3, we lay out the methodology of the asset pricing models and the data that
are used for the hypothesis tests in Section 4.1 Robustness of the analysis
is dealt with in Section 5 using the matching method. Section 6 concludes.
Despite the recent economic crises, socially responsible investing (SRI)
has been strikingly resilient and not merely a caprice of prosperous economic
times. SRI describes an investment strategy that accounts for environmen-
tal, social, and governance factors (ESG). Its global expansion in the last
decade is striking: Whereas in 2003, the European Sustainable Investment
Forum reported 336 Bio Euro invested in so-called core SRI, for 2009 the
same organization documented investments of 5’000 Bio Euro (Eurosif 2003,
2010). This reflects an annual growth rate of more than 5%. The Sustainable
Investment Forum for Germany, Austria, and Switzerland estimates that in
2010, SRI assets have increased by roughly 20 percent compared to the year
before (FNG 2011). For the United States, the Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment points out a 182% increase in total net assets from
2007 to 2010 (US-Sif 2010). In absolute terms, by now one out of eight
US dollars invested follows some sort of SRI guidelines. Even discounting
the fact that a fair amount of the worldwide growth is attributable to bond
investments and increasing asset coverage, it is fair to assume that SRI in
equities has grown substantially, highlighting the economic importance for
a systematic understanding of the financial ramifications that SRI entails.
But how might SRI (or rather, the underlying behavior it projects) affect
the financial performance of a firm? Although conventional economic theory
would roughly point to a negative association (Friedman, 1970), recent and
more pertinent descriptions of the phenomena give reason to believe that
1Some preliminary results of this paper were published in a leaflet of the Zurich Can-
tonal Bank (2011)
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there is something to be gained by SRI. Due to its roots in principal-agent-
theory, corporate governance is likely the most established theoretical branch
in this regard. The significance of corporate governance in the context of
shareholder and stakeholder value is discussed thoroughly by Tirole (2001).
Although the concept of stakeholder value - a concept which incorporates
many ESG factors - fares worse than shareholder value on many levels (such
as fuzzy tasking), it has conceptual advantages as well. Biased decision-
making in presence of negative externalities, for instance, makes for one of
the unintentional consequences of shareholder value. From a more technical
perspective, SRI has been associated with a lack of optimal portfolio diver-
sification for investors. Any restriction to the market portfolio is said to
edge away from the efficient frontier. On the other hand, Moskowitz (1972)
argues that markets might fail to price value-relevant ESG factors, leading
to higher abnormal returns for corresponding firms. We take up these the-
oretical points in the next section. Ultimately, the question whether SRI
affects firm performance negatively or positively remains an empirical one.
There is an established literature examining the empirical effect of SRI
on financial performance. Three methodologically distinct branches have
evolved: Regression analyses, event studies, and portfolio analyses. For-
merly a frequently used approach, simple regression analyses examine long-
term effects of ESG factors on financial performance. They are, however,
prone to omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Ambec and Lanoie
(2007) summarize the results of nine such studies and conclude that there
is limited evidence for a relationship.
In contrast, event studies mitigate the aforementioned caveats by fo-
cusing on a narrow time frame around an unexpected incident, say, an oil
spill or employment layoffs. This firm-specific announcement is assumed to
force a sudden reassessment of the firm’s value on the part of its investors.
In calculating abnormal returns within the specified time frame, significant
market reactions to the announcement can be deduced. Many studies indi-
cate substantial impacts on firm value from such incidents (Hamilton, 1995;
Dasgupta et al., 2001; Karpoff et al., 2005; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna,
2010; Linn, 2010). Although causally instructive, it remains unclear whether
the observed market reactions have a lasting effect on firm value and why
positive incidents often fail to show an impact.
Portfolio analyses, on the other hand, rely on a classic finance model
in order to calculate a fund’s long-term performance. Based on the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), the approach compares the abnormal returns
of SRI funds with appropriate benchmarks. Of the three research branches,
portfolio analyses currently constitute the most active one. Most studies
gather national data from actively managed SRI funds (see Derwall et al.
(2011) for a comprehensive overview). So far, the empirical results are some-
what mixed, but biased in one direction. Hardly any of the studies indicate
that SRI results in significant underperformance of the corresponding funds.
6
Most studies cannot reject the assumption of equal performance. Indeed,
some studies suggest that SRI funds fare better than the market.
Although increasingly sophisticated, the current batch of portfolio anal-
yses reveals some drawbacks of its own. By arbitrarily lumping together
SRI funds that cater to different ESG priorities, specific ESG factors that
are linked to financial performance are bound to drown in the aggregate
of a myriad of non-relevant factors. On another note, the analysis of ac-
tively managed funds might distort the effect of the specific ESG factors by
virtue of the portfolio managers’ skills, transaction costs, or in- and outflows
of assets. Most importantly, many studies disregard the risk tilts that are
associated with the idiosyncratic investment style of SRI. It has been re-
peatedly shown that the risk factors introduced by Fama and French (1993)
and Carhart (1997) explain substantial amounts of the abnormal SRI fund
returns (Bauer et al. 2005; Derwall et al. 2005, 2007; Bauer et al. 2007).
Neglecting these factors bears the risk of false conclusions with respect to
the effect of ESG factors on financial performance. As yet, there have only
been comprehensive data on US risk factors, which partly explains the heavy
US focus of the literature.
This paper investigates how a distinct selection of small growth SRI firms
fares in comparison to the market. In doing so, our portfolio analysis follows
up the existing branch of studies but broadens their scope by addressing the
aforementioned problems along four dimensions.
First, we circumvent the distortion of an active portfolio management
and the problem of an indistinct focus of aggregated funds by analyzing
specialized firms selected by the sustainability research of the Zurich Can-
tonal Bank (ZKB). These firms, mainly small growth stocks with a focus
on strategic CSR innovation, constitute a ZKB internal universe from which
the portfolio managers can pick. We treat this pool as a synthetic portfolio
and compare it to the market.
In our second contribution, we debut an exhaustive risk-adjusted portfo-
lio analysis with European data. Comprehensive pan-European risk factors,
constructed by Schmidt et al. (2011), enable us to conduct this study in the
first place and account for risk tilts that are rooted in the specific investment
style of our European portfolio.
Third, in addition to the established errors-in-expectation hypothesis
for the explanation of positive abnormal returns, we propose a structural
explanation based on a transition phase to a new equilibrium in the SRI
market. Finally, our results prompted us to go one step further and check
the robustness of our estimates. Using a propensity score matching method,
we match our portfolio annually to all the firms in the market and construct
control portfolios with highly similar characteristics in terms of size, book-
to-market value, and momentum; key figures upon which the risk factors are
based. To our knowledge, this method has never been applied in a portfolio
study in combination with asset pricing models. In doing so, we introduce
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a new technique to the existing literature.
We find a robust outperformance for the analyzed portfolio across differ-
ent scenarios. In terms of the Carhart four-factor model, the outperformance
amounts to 1.3% monthly. Although there is reason to believe that some
model misspecification is present due to the portfolio’s tilt towards small
and medium sized growth firms, the outperformance is at most reduced to
1% when adjusting for this issue. The rest of this paper is structured as
follows. The next section discusses two hypotheses that describe the rela-
tionship between SRI and financial performance. In Section 3, we lay out
the methodology of the asset pricing models and the data that are used for
the hypothesis tests in Section 4. 2 Robustness of the analysis is dealt with
in Section 5 using the matching method. Section 6 concludes.
2 SRI and Financial Performance
This section presents two distinct arguments that explain why our SRI port-
folio might exhibit abnormal returns. First, the small growth firms distin-
guish themselves strategically based on their innovative approach in tackling
sustainable solutions to societal problems. In contrast to conventional, more
universal CSR classifications, we argue that our portfolio rather fits the no-
tion of so-called strategic CSR. The relationship between generic SRIs and
financial performance has been studied widely. Newer evidence indicates
that this attention might have dispelled any errors in expectations by the
market (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Derwall et al., 2011). We are thus more
likely to find these mispricings in the specialized strategic CSR niche of our
portfolio. The second argument relates to the influence of the rapidly rising
market share of SRI on stock prices. Positive screening could lead to market
disequilibrium accompanied by positive abnormal returns. Although both
arguments can be characterized by market imperfections, they tackle the
issue from different angles. The reasoning gives rise to our hypothesis and
testable implications, which are the subject of the next sections.
Economists have traditionally been wary about the proposition that so-
cially benevolent investments are financially beneficial for firms. A prevailing
objection is the incompatibility with the objective of profit maximization,
claiming that diverting resources from this goal for CSR reasons is bound
to make a firm worse off (Friedman, 1970). Even if CSR were to have any
value-relevance, firms would have adopted it long ago. The premise is that
if market participants could act more efficiently by adjusting their actions,
they would do so by assumption. But evidently, not all choices are optimal
in the first place, for we observe how companies keep finding new ways to
raise their competitiveness by lowering costs and expanding market shares
2Some preliminary results of this paper were published in a leaflet of the Zurich Can-
tonal Bank (2011)
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in innovative ways. Though often associated with a constraint, there is
reason to believe that CSR can be used strategically to such ends as well.
Recent economic frameworks suggest that there does exist a financial case
for so-called strategic CSR.
The seminal publications of McWilliams and Siegel (2001) and Baron
(2001), both of whom originally coined the term strategic CSR, stress the
role of product differentiation in this context. In line with the predictions of
strategic CSR, Siegel and Vitalino (2007) show that firms selling experience
goods are more likely to engage in CSR for strategic reasons. Bagnoli and
Watts (2003) define CSR as the private provision of a public good and
present a model in which firms compete for socially responsible consumers.
Besley and Ghatak (2007) pick up on this definition and discuss potential
advantages of CSR as a provision of public goods. A prominent summary of
the theoretical strategic CSR literature has been brought forward by Porter
and Kramer (2006, 2011). They subsume the concept of strategic CSR
and dub it shared value, ”policies and operating practices that enhance the
competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic
and social conditions in the communities in which it operates” (Porter and
Kramer, 2011, p.67). In a nutshell, shared value or strategic CSR is both
beneficial for the firm and the community it operates in. Strategic CSR
involves a break from the commonly defensive and naive application of CSR.
According to Porter and Kramer, by and large companies have made use
of CSR as a preemptive or a mitigating shield that protects them from
potential accusations concerning their business practice when, in reality,
they should focus on the interdependence of business and society. To this
end, it is proposed that companies incorporate aspects of CSR in a non-
fragmented, targeted way as to establish a business strategy. So instead of
addressing every possible justifiable CSR concern, a company should analyze
its competitive landscape and its strengths and weaknesses that overlap
with specific CSR aspects. On this basis, it should employ its comparative
advantage to create a unique position that distinguishes it from the rest
of the market. In this sense, strategic CSR is in line with the traditional
economic argument of profit maximization as the firm’s objective.
To the casual observer, strategic CSR can be mistaken for generic CSR
as they share the same toolbox. But instead of applying these tools loosely
at different market frontiers, strategic CSR integrates them into a coherent
business strategy. In order to differentiate between the generic and strategic
CSR, one needs to be both knowledgeable about a firm’s strategy as a whole
and the economic advantages that strategic CSR entails in that case. This
is no easy task, in particular because the concept has merely begun to take
root. Unlike generic CSR, strategic CSR cannot (yet) easily be extracted
from ESG data but requires skilled expertise, entailing considerable costs.
In turn, these costs put into perspective any financial market advantage
resulting from such research.
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The incorporation of potentially value-relevant information from strate-
gic CSR is thus likely to take some time. This argument is supported by
the fact that recently, some CSR studies have failed to find the superior
risk-adjusted returns they used to. For example, Derwall et al. (2011) show
that in the United States the positive abnormal returns of firms with a
high score in employee relations as measured by Kinder, Lydenberg, and
Domini (KLD) diminish over time.3 Derwall et al. argue that any errors
in investors’ expectations regarding value-relevant information of CSR are
bound to be temporary as the market moves along its learning curve. In-
deed, incorporation of CSR information, not only in form of KLD scores,
has become ubiquitous among investors (Eccles et al., 2011a). Consequently,
any value-relevant information that generic CSR potentially used to proxy
for would likely have been arbitraged by now, accounting for the disappear-
ance of positive abnormal returns. By the same token, formerly positive
abnormal returns from good corporate governance seem to have vanished.
The widely cited governance-based investment strategy put forth by Gom-
pers et al. (2003) and modified by Bebchuk et al. (2009) show how the
US market apparently failed to correctly price so-called ”entrenching” gov-
ernance provisions in the 1990s. However, the superior returns from holding
firms with few such provisions (and shorting the ones with many) have dis-
appeared. In a follow-up paper, Bebchuk et al. (2011) show that during the
2000s any abnormal returns ceased to exist with respect to good governance.
Like Derwall et al. (2011), Bebchuk et al. (2011) attribute this disappear-
ance to a mispricing that has disappeared once markets have learned how
to price these provisions correctly. Bebchuk et al. underpin this argument
by showing that during the 1990s corporate governance was associated with
fundamental firm differences in drivers of corporate performance: Until the
2000s (stock) market analysts were more positively surprised by the earnings
announcements of well governed firms than by those of poorly governed ones,
producing positive abnormal returns in the amount of 69 basis points from
1990-1999. The disappearance of abnormal returns in 2000-2008 coincided
with increased attention to corporate governance by the media and market
participants. In both Derwall et al. and Bebchuk et al., markets have even-
tually adjusted to a pricing equilibrium; not instantly but gradually over
time.
To sum up the errors-in-expectations argument, given the present state
of ESG data, strategic CSR seems more difficult to identify than generic
CSR. On the other hand, economic theory suggests that strategic CSR po-
tentially harbors value-relevant information, information that the market
might have yet to incorporate.
3In the empirical SRI literature, the KLD rating is an established proxy for the mea-
surement of various dimensions of CSR for a selection of firms.
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In addition to investors’ errors in expectations, there is a complemen-
tary argument that can explain positive abnormal returns. Given plausible
assumptions, it turns out that rising demand in SRI can affect abnormal re-
turns. In empirical studies based on stock market data, an outperformance
could stem from two sources. Better than expected fundamentals of compa-
nies (and the ensuing stronger stock demand of investors) on the one hand,
and rising stock demand without changes in the companies’ cash flows on
the other hand. Both effects lead to higher stock prices.
Relating to the latter effect, particularly in Europe managed assets fol-
lowing SRI strategies have grown considerably in the last decade. It can be
argued that this growth itself has affected stock prices positively.
Like any active investment strategy, SRI assumes that rational asset
pricing models do not capture all relevant factors. After all, it is the aim
of these strategies to outperform the market. Under rational asset pric-
ing models, investors should simply buy stocks according to their current
market weights. Some SRI investors, however, will deviate from current
market weights of stocks for financial reasons. They will overweight cer-
tain stocks if they observe attractive SRI features that proxy for overlooked
value-relevance and conversely will underweight stocks that they deem to
be too expensive in this regard. As a consequence, SRI investment will
have an impact on stock prices and investments of firms if demand and sup-
ply curves are not fully elastic (Wall, 1995). This could happen if rational
pricing models have not captured all relevant factors or if not all market
participants invest accordingly. Following this argument, Petajisto (2009)
puts forth a model in which CAPM investors, active managers (such as SRI
followers), and noise traders can coexist in equilibrium. The effect of ris-
ing SRI demand is more pronounced if the supply of stocks is less elastic.
Stocks with a high market capitalization enjoy higher analyst coverage and
larger institutional ownership. It is therefore plausible to assume that the
supply of large capitalization stocks is more elastic than the supply of small
capitalization stocks. From this perspective, our portfolio of small growth
stocks portrays a pronounced case of a relatively inelastic supply. Following
this argument, rising demand from SRI investors will affect stock prices of
these companies all the more, leading to a financial outperformance in form
of positive abnormal returns.
There is a body of empirical papers which are consistent with this ar-
gument. They analyze SRI performance in the US, where growth in SRI
assets was particularly strong in the 1990s. In general, most of these studies
find that risk-adjusted SRI returns are comparable to those of conventional
benchmarks. There are some studies, though, which present a positive re-
lation between certain CSR criteria and financial performance. Derwall et
al. (2005) show that a portfolio scoring high on eco-efficiency criteria out-
performs a portfolio of low scoring firms by 3.3% per year from 1995-2003.
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) find that a portfolio with high social responsi-
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bility ratings from KLD outperforms a portfolio with low scores by up to
8.7% per year over the period from 1992-2004. Eccles et al. (2011b) use
a matched sample of 180 companies and document that, from 1993-2010, a
portfolio of high sustainability companies reveals an annual abnormal per-
formance of 4.8% compared to a portfolio of low sustainability companies.
And most recently, Derwall et al. (2011) find that a portfolio of positively
screened stocks, highly rated on employee-relations, earned positive abnor-
mal returns of 5.6% per year from 1992-2002. The exponential growth of
SRI assets in Europe in the last decade coincides with our empirical time
frame, which is indicative that rising demand might have affected financial
performance.
Taken together, we identify two channels through which positive abnor-
mal returns can emerge. Strategic CSR can contain value-relevant infor-
mation, which due to errors in investors’ expectations can lead to positive
abnormal returns in the respective stocks. Complementary, rising demand
in SRI can produce positive abnormal returns brought about by market
frictions. These two arguments motivate our hypothesis that particularly
in times of rising demand, small and strategic CSR stocks are positively
associated with financial performance, a hypothesis we empirically test for
in the next sections.
3 Data and Methodology
Innovation acts as one particular channel of strategic CSR. Product and pro-
cess innovation require foresight, assessments about future market dynamics,
and likely considerable investments in the present. The focus is not on short-
term profit maximization but on long-term growth, all features commonly
associated with sustainability. With this notion, the sustainability research
team of ZKB identifies small and middle capitalized firms offering innovative
products and services. We henceforth refer to this portfolio as ”innovators”.
These innovators emphasize sustainable solutions from a societal point of
view against the backdrop of climate change and the demographic trend of
ageing. The firms can be allocated to the following six domains: renewable
energy, energy efficiency, mobility, natural resources, health, and education.
We conjecture that the innovators fit both the strategic CSR argument and
the rising demand argument.
Table 1 reports the number of firms in the innovator portfolio and the
average annual market value compared to our entire universe of European
firms. Apart from the years 2006 and 2007, the average size of an innovator
is roughly half the market value of the average European firm included in the
Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters Worldscope database.
The number of innovators increases from 16 firms in 2002 to 77 firms in 2009.
The portfolio shows a distinct tilt towards the industrial sector in general
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and towards energy related industries in particular, with the services sec-
tor playing only a minor role. According to the International Classification
Benchmark (ICB), Table 2 shows that about two thirds of the 290 firms
operate in the ”Oil & Gas” and ”Industrials” industry, 42 in utilities, 17 in
the technology industry, and 16 in basic materials. This highlights that the
innovator portfolio is tilted towards certain industries. A look at industry
subsector levels in Table 3 reveals that roughly a third of the innovators
deals with renewable energy equipment, followed by clusters geared towards
industrial machinery, alternative electricity, alternative fuels, and building
materials and fixtures. Table 4 presents the distribution of firm-year obser-
vations across the European countries. German firms constitute roughly 60
percent of the portfolio. We address both sector and country bias in our
robustness checks in Section 5.
It is worth pointing out again that this selection of firms constitutes
a synthetic portfolio, and not an actively managed one. By virtue of this
synthetic construction, we avoid issues of performance distortions such as
portfolio manager skills or in- and outflows, which are generally unavoidable
when analyzing performances of (sustainability) funds.4
In the heyday of the CAPM, value weighting would have been the obvious
answer to the question which weighting scheme to apply to our portfolio.
But ever since the empirical shortcomings of the CAPM became known,
other weighting schemes such as Bayesian approaches to estimation error,
methods of moment restrictions, portfolio constraints, optimal combinations
of portfolios, or equal weighting merit consideration as well. After evalu-
ating 14 models in seven empirical datasets, DeMiguel et al. (2009) come
to the conclusion that the equal weighting 1/N portfolio strategy (which
they dub ”naive diversification”) ”should serve at least as a first obvious
benchmark” (p. 1948). In order to reduce the influence of idiosyncratic risk
in combination with firm heterogeneity in terms of size, we have therefore
opted for the equal weighting method as our base case for both the innovator
and the control portfolios.5
In order to assess how the innovators perform, we build a synthetic port-
folio. For the appraisal of the performance of both the innovator and the
control portfolios, which we construct in our robustness checks in Section
5, we employ pan-European risk factors of the standard four-factor capital
asset pricing model based on Carhart (1997) as control variables. These
4Transaction costs such as commissions, bid/ask spreads, and market impact influence
fund performance as well. For that reason, transaction costs are often considered in the
practical implementation of theoretical investment strategies in synthetic portfolios. In
our case, the inclusion of transaction costs would somewhat reduce absolute and abnormal
returns, but only marginally as 82% of the firms remain in the synthetic portfolio until
2009. Therefore, this strategy would have a low turnover and negligible transaction costs.
5Calculations of value weighted portfolios tend to yield similar results and are available
from the authors upon request.
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risk factors have only recently been calculated by a group of researchers
of the Universities of Aarhus and Zurich and ETH of Zurich (Schmidt et
al., 2011).6 Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters World-
scope are the underlying databases for the calculation of these factors. The
dataset consists of 43’005 European firms for the period of 1980 to April
2009. Both static and dynamic screens as well as numerous other quality
checks reduced the number of firms available to 11’054 for the calculation
of the market return, 9’462 for the calculation of the returns for size and
value, and 10’035 for the calculation of the momentum factor, respectively.
All financial data were converted into US dollars. For values before 2002, a
fixed euro conversion rate was applied. Other currencies were converted via
the at that time current exchange rate. The resulting database for the fac-
tors size, value, momentum, and the market encompasses the period from
January 1985 to April 2009. Since its introduction, a wide range of em-
pirical studies have shown that the one-factor model based on the market
model (Sharpe, 1964) and the CAPM (Markowitz, 1952) describe the cross
section of stock returns insufficiently. In particular, small and value stocks
reveal systematically diverging stock returns which cannot be predicted by
the market model. Based on the evidence of these ”anomalies”, Fama and
French (1993) advocate a three-factor model, which, in addition to the ex-
cess return of the market, adds two factors that proxy for size and value.
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) add to this insight. They show that stocks
which have performed exceptionally well during the last twelve months tend
to continue doing so in the next few months. Carhart (1997) incorporates
this additional momentum factor into Fama and French’s three-factor model.
This four-factor model has proven to be better in terms of explanatory power
of cross sectional stock returns and is now the most commonly used asset
pricing model in financial economics. The following equation formalizes the
four-factor model:
rit − rft = αi + βi1(rmt − rft) + βi2SMBt + βi3HMLt + βi4WMLt + it
The excess return of a stock is decomposed on the basis of the four
aforementioned factors market, size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum
(WML). rit stands for the return of a given stock portfolio in month t, rft
is the return of the risk free asset (in our case, the euro 1-month libor rate),
and rmt is the return of the pan-European market. The return series for the
factor SMBt is the difference between the returns of portfolios consisting of
stocks with low market capitalization and portfolios consisting of stocks with
6By now, these factors also form part of the basis in the analysis of Mollet and Ziegler
(2012), who investigate the performance of firms with high market values in the US and
Europe.
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high market capitalization. The return series for HMLt is the difference
between the returns of portfolios consisting of stocks with a high book-to-
market ratio and portfolios consisting of stocks with a low book-to-market
equity ratio. Finally, the return series for the momentum factor WMLt is
the return difference between a portfolio of past winners and a portfolio of
past losers. The application of the four-factor model yields estimates for
the coefficients βi1, βi2, βi3, βi4, and αi. The coefficients βi1, βi2, βi3 and
βi4 mirror the sensitivities of a given portfolio to the factors market risk,
size, value, and momentum, it stands for the error term, and αi reflects
the average periodical (positive or negative) abnormal performance which
cannot be explained by the four factors.
4 Results
The average monthly market return over the entire portfolio time span from
1/2002 to 4/2009 amounts to 0.30% (Table 5). This average return over 88
months is 0.01 percentage points below the yield of the risk free rate. When
partitioning the full time period into two equally long sub-periods, we see
that the dismal market performance is attributable to the second sub-period
covering 9/2005 to 4/2009. This sub-period captures the financial crisis
triggered in 2007 and yields an average monthly market return of -0.78%,
while the risk free rate manages to return 0.39%. On the other hand, in the
first sub-period between 1/2002 and 8/2005, the market generated monthly
returns of 1.37%, whereas the risk-free interest rate offered only 0.23%.
Focusing on the average monthly return of the innovators in Table 5, we
observe that the yield of 0.74% is substantially higher than the market return
and that this result is driven by the second sub-period, during which the
innovators fared much better than the market. The risk factors offer a more
nuanced insight of this performance. WML indicates that winners from the
previous months by far outperform recent losers in all time periods: The
momentum strategy generates monthly returns exceeding 1% in all periods.
The returns of the SMB and HML strategy, 0.41% and 0.55% respectively,
are both explained by their strong performance in the first sub-period. In
the second sub-period, these strategies were barely profitable. These obser-
vations are in line with the theoretical reasoning of SMB and HML. The
second sub-period largely covers an economic recession. During these harsh
times, small and value firms are said to perform worse. Small firms exhibit
problems in raising capital, and value firms find themselves unable to sub-
stantially lower any running capital costs, something growth firms are apt to
do. Unlike value firms, growth firms can postpone investment expenditures
as they are more flexible. Table 6 reports the Carhart four-factor model
regression results for the full time period and the two sub-periods. Within
a given estimation window, the factor loadings are assumed to be fix even
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though they might change as portfolio composition, risk perceptions, and
demanded risk premia are likely to vary through time. In this sense, the
sub-periods serve as a rough first robustness check in terms of temporal de-
pendence. Below, we implement a more sophisticated approach to this issue.
In order to control for possible distortions in the covariance of the estimates
due to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the disturbance term, only
robust heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent z-statistics accord-
ing to Newey and West (1987) are reported. In line with common practice
(Greene, 2002), the error structure is assumed to be possibly autocorrelated
up to three lags.7
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates of the Carhart four-factor model.
The alpha of the equally weighted innovator portfolio is outperforming the
value weighted market monthly by 1.30%, a return which is significant at
the 5% level. In contrast to the descriptive analysis, this outperformance
cannot be clearly attributed to a particular sub-period. Because the market
beta is always larger than one, the innovator portfolio is magnifying market
movements and is therefore exposed to a higher systematic risk.
The significant and positive SMB loading in the first period highlights
that the innovator portfolio performs well due to its tilt towards small stocks.
On the other hand, the HML factor captures a significant negative loading
variation of the innovator portfolio return in the full time period. This is
attributable to the first sub-period because the point estimate of the HML
loading in the second sub-period is low and not significant. Recall that
Table 5 indicates that value firms outperform growth firms during the first
sub-period, driving the outperformance over the full time span. The in-
novator portfolio mainly consists of small growth companies and exhibits a
significant exposure to the risk factors SMB and HML. The outperformance
of small cap stocks in the first sub-period therefore added to the absolute
return of the portfolio. The strong tilt towards growth stocks on the other
hand reduced the absolute performance in first sub-period when value stocks
had a good run. But the outperformance of the innovator portfolio in com-
parison to the European market - as displayed by the statistically significant
alpha of 1.30% per month - was achieved more or less continuously over the
whole observation period. As we will see in the following section, the growth
character of the innovator portfolio is also supported when comparing the
book-to-market-equity ratios in Table 9.
The two sub-periods offer only a limited glimpse into the intertemporal
changes in portfolio composition, risk perceptions, and demanded risk pre-
mia. Figure 1 gives a more differentiated view by plotting the coefficients
of the four-factor model and their 95% confidence intervals for a moving
window regression. The method uses the estimation technique from Table 6
7Current practice specifies the number of lags to be approximately the fourth root of
the number of time series observations.
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and applies it to a rolling regression time window of 36 months. This win-
dow selection translates into 30 degrees of freedom in the model estimation.
The first regression window covers 1/2002 to 12/2004. Its coefficients and
confidence intervals are plotted at the end of this range. Subsequently, the
plots are updated by moving the time window forward monthly.8 This tech-
nique has the advantage of not relying on disjoint and arbitrary time periods
and allows for flexibility and structural interruptions in the estimates. The
rolling regression plot for the alpha illustrates that the point estimates of
the intercept of the innovator portfolio remain positive throughout the ob-
served time window. The previous analysis of the two sub-periods revealed
that the positive alpha is not driven by either time window. The rolling
regressions are in line with this view, lending credibility to the robustness
of the estimates.9
The results support our hypothesis. The portfolio of small growth firms
with a strategic CSR implementation realizes a systematic stock market
outperformance during 2002-2009. In terms of the hypothesis, this outper-
formance might be attributable to overlooked but value-relevant strategic
CSR characteristics of these firms and to positive stock price effects result-
ing from a rapidly growing SRI demand. Due to the size of its stocks, the
portfolio is especially prone to such stock price effects because stock price
elasticity is likely positively related to firm size. However, there remains a
methodological caveat associated with the findings. The results might not
be reliable if an inappropriate model was applied to describe equilibrium
asset prices. To clear up doubt on the reliability of the results, in the next
section we evaluate the performance of the innovator portfolio compared to
similar benchmark portfolios.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 A Matching Approach
Market efficiency can only be tested jointly with some equilibrium model,
in this case an asset pricing model. Therefore, one might argue that the
interpretation of anomalous evidence is ambiguous, because the hypothesis
of zero abnormal returns is tested jointly with the hypothesis that the as-
set pricing model used to estimate abnormal returns is valid (e.g. Fama,
8Due to different time windows, the graphical representation of the four-factor model
in Figure 1 is not directly comparable with the results in Table 6 .
9As an additional robustness check, we estimated the four-factor model with the both
the market return and the risk factors computed on the basis of equally weighted re-
turns. The results did not change. The aim of the matching specification is to improve
the balance between the innovator firms and the control firms with respect to the vari-
ables assumed to be of relevance. We tried different combinations and transformations
of the firm characteristics SIZE, BEME, and MOM and identified the specification (2) as
delivering the most balanced samples in our favored matching scenario.
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1970, 1991). This so-called joint hypothesis problem is well known in the
literature. It implies that if the used asset pricing model provides an im-
perfect description of expected returns, the estimated intercept (alpha) rep-
resents the combined effects of model misspecification and mispricing. In-
deed, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor asset pricing model exhibits
difficulties in explaining the average stock return of small firms and firms
with high book-to-market ratios (e.g. Barber & Lyon, 1997). In particu-
lar, Fama (1998) is concerned with bad model problems when considering
equal weighted portfolios because all common asset pricing models have
systematic problems in explaining the average returns of small stocks. The
joint hypothesis problem thus seems to be of eminent interest when equal
weighted stock returns of small to middle sized growth firms are analyzed.
This motivates further robustness checks in our case.
Lyon et al. (1999) demonstrate that the three-factor model is misspec-
ified for samples of non-randomly selected firms. They recommend com-
paring sample firms to the general population based on size (SIZE) and
book-to-market equity ratios (BEME) as well as on the pre-event return
performance and other characteristics. Likewise, Barber and Lyon (1997)
favor this control firm approach when comparing different buy-and-hold ab-
normal return methods to evaluate long-run abnormal returns in event stud-
ies.
In order to investigate if the results in Section 4 are driven by bad model
problems, we investigate whether we find similar anomalous evidence in
portfolios with similar characteristics as the innovator portfolio. For one,
the innovator portfolio is biased in SIZE and BEME. It also reveals sub-
stantial country- and industry-specific expositions. One might argue that
some of these extreme portfolio characteristics produce extrapolation bias or
that the linearly specified Carhart four-factor model might not be well spec-
ified to explain the returns of this portfolio. Ho et al. (2007) illustrate that
model dependence in general can be reduced by combining the estimation of
structural equation models with data preprocessing by matching treatment
and control groups. The central idea of this approach is that if exact match-
ing is not feasible, common parametric procedures can potentially improve
inference even after matching because of variation in the covariates. In this
vein, we compare the asset pricing model estimates of the innovator portfolio
to synthetic reference portfolios with similar characteristics. If these control
portfolios exhibit similar abnormal returns in comparison to the innovator
portfolio, we have evidence that the Carhart four-factor model might indeed
suffer from misspecification for this portfolio type.
Portfolio matching methods have been applied previously in the litera-
ture. Mitchell and Stafford (2000), for example, consider SIZE and BEME
in the construction of reference portfolios on the basis of specific portfolio
assignments. In contrast to their approach we construct reference portfolios
not by traditional matching methods but by matching the innovators to all
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European firms in the market based on a propensity score. Conventional
matching approaches notoriously have difficulties in simultaneously match-
ing multiple dimensions. Their sequential approach - such as prescreening
based on SIZE, followed by a nearest BEME matching - implies that op-
timizing matching quality in one dimension usually comes at the cost of
deteriorating matching quality in other dimensions. In contrast, propensity
score matching (PSM) reduces a multi-dimensional problem to one single
score, the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
Li and Zhao (2006) use PSM to identify similar firms based on size,
BEME, and momentum. In studying the event-time buy-and-hold abnor-
mal return approach of firms with primary seasoned equity offerings, Li and
Zhao compare the mean and median returns of the event and the matched
control firm portfolios, albeit without estimating any parametrical model.
They find that the PSM method delivers better results than the conventional
matching methods applied by Lyon et al. (1999), explaining away partially
the anomalous behavior of small issuers. They also find that adding ad-
ditional variables in the propensity score specification estimation has only
marginal effects. In other settings, PSM has been applied by Aggarwal et al.
(2009) to compare the governance of US and non-US firms and by Drucker
and Puri (2005) to investigate the benefits of concurrent lending and un-
derwriting. To our knowledge, PSM has yet to be applied in conjunction
with asset pricing models to evaluate abnormal returns. We take up on the
argument of Ho et al. (2007) and combine PSM with a structural model in
order to check for model dependence.
In the estimation of the propensity score variables affecting the depen-
dent and the treatment variable should be included, termed ”minimum rel-
evant information set” by Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004). On this
note, following Li and Zhao (2006) we use firm level SIZE, BEME, and
11-month pre-matching momentum (MOM) for a 1-to-1 nearest neighbor
propensity score matching. We argue that using a PSM, we can construct
an appropriate evaluation benchmark to reappraise the robustness of our
results.
If a firm is identified by the ZKB research team as an innovator in year
γ, the firm is retained in the innovator portfolio in the year γ + 1. This
implies that the innovator portfolio is sorted in December of year γ and its
holding period is γ + 1.
Λ(xτ , β) = Prob(Innovator = yes|xt) (1)
x
′
τ = SIZEτ , log(SIZEτ ), log(SIZEτ )
2, log(SIZEτ )
3, (2)
BEMEτ ,MOMτ
Each December, we estimate equation (1) with a logistic regression. If
linear covariates in the propensity score estimation are not producing good
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matching quality, higher order terms or interaction terms should be added
according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Starting with linear covariates,
we added transformations of the SIZE variable to obtain better balance on
this dimension, tried different other specifications, and concluded that the
predictor variables in vector xτ of equation (2) deliver the best balance as
measured by mean and median differences for pooled PSM over all years.10
The index τ is a monthly indicator and fixed to December of each year
in equation (2). SIZEτ is the market value in million USD, the book-to-
market ratio BEMEτ is the ratio of common equity to the market value of
equity, and MOMτ is the geometric average of the monthly returns over a
window of 11 months from t − 12 to t − 2.11 Based on the vector xτ , the
probability of being an innovator firm is predicted for the general population
of European firms. For the matching procedure, we adhere to the guidelines
provided by Guo and Fraser (2009) and use the predicted probability p to
define logit = log(1−pp ) as the propensity score. In turn, this score is used for
a 1-to-1 matching without replacement in descending order with a caliper
of one-fourth of the standard deviation of the annual propensity scores to
ensure a certain level of common support. The matching procedure is done
using the Stata package psmatch2 from Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Nearest
neighborhood matching is executed separately every year. In the base case
scenario the nearest matches are restricted to the same countries because
our result might have been confounded by the overrepresentation of German
firms in our sample.12 Due to this country restriction and the used caliper,
innovator firms are being dropped in a specific year if no other firm within
the same country has a sufficiently close propensity score. Control firms
constitute firms in the market with monthly return values in the sorting
year and with plausible available values of SIZE and BEME in Decem-
ber of the sorting year.13 Because the control firm portfolio is held in the
months after December of the sorting year, potential control firms need to
remain in the market for the entire year after the sorting year. In addition
to the country base case we construct two alternative control firm portfolios
by restricting the nearest neighborhood PSM to the same industry and (in
the most restrictive scenario) to both the same country and industry. The
last matching scenario requires exact matching in two dimensions and in-
10The aim of the matching specification is to improve the balance between the innovator
firms and the control firms with respect to the variables assumed to be of relevance.
We tried different combinations and transformations of the firm characteristics SIZE,
BEME, and MOM and identified the specification (2) as delivering the most balanced
samples in our favored matching scenario.
11Per common practice, common equity is required to be greater. In addition, we added
investment tax credits to common equity.
12The Thomson Reuters Datastream Variable ’GEOGN’ was used as the country iden-
tifier.
13Book equity is the sum of common equity and investment tax credit and is restricted
not to be negative. In addition, we rely on the filters applied in Schmidt et al. (2011).
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flates the number of cells considered. It consequently reduces the number
of firms in each cell. Because of the caliper, this results in reduced sam-
ple sizes. Whereas our original sample contains 290 firm-observations, the
exact country restriction and the exact industry restriction yield 237 and
236 firm-observations, respectively. The most restrictive exact country and
industry match leaves us with 199 firm-observations.
Additionally, similar to Mitchell and Stafford (2000) we apply resampling
procedures to derive the expected abnormal performance of the innovators
given their sample composition. We still identify similar firms by PSM but
now match, in each year, the ten most similar firms to every innovator firm.
From this pool of control firms we draw 1’000 calendar-time portfolio sam-
ples and estimate the expected intercept from these random samples by
sampling in each draw (with replacement) 30 control firms in every year.
Based on these draws we also estimate the expected intercept of portfolios
of innovators that are most similar to the sampled control firms. Applying
different matching scenarios, we estimate alpha distributions conditional on
differently composed sample compositions. First we use PSM based on the
characteristics SIZE, BEME, and MOM . We then restrict the ten nearest
neighbor PSM to the same country and, in addition, to the same industry.
Finally, we require an exact country and industry match. In this last match-
ing specification we have to weaken the matching specifications in order to
obtain a sufficient sample size by matching only the five nearest neighbors
and by dropping the caliper. The resampling approach is of interest because
there might not be one specific firm that serves as the definite control firm.
Moreover, the considered time period of eight years is not very long but
quite turbulent, making it more difficult to find significant results. There-
fore, the inspection and comparison of the alpha distribution of resampled
control and innovator portfolios might provide additional insight.
5.2 Results with Control Firms
Table 7 reports the number of firm-years in the innovator portfolio and the
generated portfolio of control firms across different industries for the coun-
try match, our base case scenario. Among the industries, ”Oil & Gas” and
”Industrials” continue covering the major part of firm-years in the innova-
tor portfolio. In contrast, the control firm portfolio reveals a tilt towards
”Financials”. Table 8 verifies the effectiveness of the exact country match.
In Tables 9, 10, and 11, the portfolio characteristics SIZE, BEME, and
MOM of the innovator (I), control (C), and market (M) portfolios are jux-
taposed. The means and medians of these portfolio characteristics offer a
rough picture of the balance improvement achieved by the matching. Table 9
lists annual means and Table 10 reports annual medians for the three port-
folios and the identified portfolio characteristics. On an annual basis, these
tables confirm that the characteristics SIZE, BEME, and MOM are more
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similar between the innovator and the control firm portfolio than between
the innovator and the market portfolio. These properties are summarized
in Table 11. From 2001 to 2008, the mean absolute difference between the
control and innovator portfolio on the one hand and the market and inno-
vator portfolio on the other hand shows a tenfold reduction in the control
portfolio for the characteristic SIZE and a threefold reduction for BEME
and MOM in comparison to the market. These absolute differences are
averaged across all the years for the annual means and medians of the three
characteristics. The absolute mean differences of the medians tell a similar
story. The differences in SIZE, BEME, and MOM are two to seven times
smaller for the control firm portfolio than for the market portfolio. The
control firm portfolio thus appears to be a more appropriate benchmark for
the innovator portfolio. The average monthly return of the market and the
risk-free rate in Table 12 are taken from Table 4. The reduction in the in-
novator firm-years reduces the average return of the innovator portfolio for
the overall period by 0.27% points from 0.74% to 0.47%. This is traceable
to the lower return in the first sub-period because the data preprocessing
produced a marginal higher innovator return in the second sub-period. The
average return of the control firm portfolio for the overall period was a mod-
est 0.21%. The control firm portfolio has achieved a high return in the first
sub-period, but this was offset by a large negative return of 1.13% in the
second sub-period. Table 13 presents the regression results for the Carhart
four-factor model for both the innovator and the control firm portfolio. The
alpha of the innovator portfolio, which is now reduced in terms of sample
size, is significant and 1.34% for the entire time period. Although positive,
the according point estimates for the sub-periods are not statistically differ-
ent from zero. In contrast, the portfolio of control firms never exhibits an
alpha different from zero at conventional significance levels. Interestingly,
the control firm portfolio mimics market movements more closely than the
innovator portfolio with a market beta close to one in all time periods. This
holds also true for all the following control firm matching specifications. The
parameter estimates of the four-factor model with control firms derived by
exact industry matching are shown in Table 14. Compared to the country
restriction, the industry restriction yields a slightly different sample of inno-
vator firms. However, the alpha for the entire time span remains significant
at 1.37%. Even though none of the alphas of the control firms are statis-
tically different from zero, it should be noted that the point estimates are
always positive. What is more, the z-statistic for the overall period proves
to be the highest among all the control firm scenarios. This suggests the
presence of a certain positive industry effect. The results therefore suggest
that the sustainability research team of the ZKB managed to identify out-
performing companies within booming industries. In a last robustness check
using one-to-one nearest neighbor PSM, we match both by country and in-
dustry. The results depicted in Table 15 back up the outperformance of
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the innovator portfolio. The reduction of the innovator alpha to 1.05% and
the upward shift of the significance level to 10% can be explained by the
substantial reduction of the sample through the caliper matching. In this
scenario as well, the alphas of the control firm portfolio are not significant.
Finally, Table 16 presents the alpha distribution of 1’000 resampled con-
trol and innovator portfolios based on the Carhart four-factor model. The
parameter values indicate that the alpha distributions are very symmetric.
The resampling shows that the 5% percentile of the control portfolio is al-
ways negative while the same percentile for the innovator portfolio is always
substantially above zero for the innovators. Therefore, 90% of the alphas as
enclosed by the 5% and 95% percentiles are substantially above zero for the
innovators in each matching scenario while the same distributions for the
control firm portfolio include zero. If the asset pricing model we are using
were a perfect description of expected returns for the analyzed portfolios, we
would expect a mean of zero for the alpha of the control portfolios. However,
these means turn out to be positive with a monthly outperformance ranging
between 0.16% and 0.31%. This indicates that our alpha estimate for the
innovator portfolio should be corrected downwards. We conclude that the
returns of our equally weighted innovator portfolio outperformed the market
from 1/2002 to 4/2009 by at least around 1% monthly. To sum up, despite
the stringent country and industry matchings, the performance of the inno-
vator portfolio remains robust in all scenarios, providing additional support
for our hypothesis.
6 Conclusion
There are no established characteristics that divide firms into an SRI class,
let alone a class that reflects a distinct strategic sustainability concept. In-
stead, many studies apply indices that are specifically built to arrange such
a categorization. It stands to reason that within such indices, elaborate
as they are, specific performance-driving effects of SRI might get lost in
aggregation. In other words, the validity of conclusions with respect to
SRI and financial performance hinges on the construction of the SRI class.
Our basket of innovators reflects the specific notion of strategic CSR and
therefore circumvents this issue. In addition, the synthetic portfolio offers a
glimpse at a portfolio selection stage that is not distorted by active portfolio
management skills.
The case for positive abnormal returns of this portfolio is given by a
hypothesis that rests upon two channels. On the one hand, value-relevant
information of strategic CSR may not have been priced in by the market.
On the other hand, market disequilibrium caused by rising demand for SRI
assets might have produced positive returns via stock price effects. To test
the hypothesis of positive abnormal returns, we conduct a portfolio analysis
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based on a novel comprehensive dataset with pan-European Carhart risk
factors. This accounts for the well-known systematic risks in SRI portfolios
and eschews mistaken attributions of observed out- or underperformance.
The results of the portfolio analysis strongly support the hypothesis of fi-
nancial outperformance with a stable alpha of 1.30% per month.
Even so, one might argue that the financial performance driver might be
confounded by bad model problems due to firm characteristics. To mitigate
this possibility, we construct synthetic benchmark portfolios with similar
control firms, additionally accounting for country and industry clusters. The
matched portfolios underpin the significant financial outperformance of the
innovators. A final prudent resampling approach yields a more conservative
innovators alpha of roughly 1%. In other words, none of the robustness
checks qualify the general results.
It is instructive to discuss the implications of both arguments of the hy-
pothesis. Most CSR research has focused on easily quantifiable CSR charac-
teristics for large firms. By now, potentially value-relevant factors embedded
within or proxied by these characteristics can be extracted systematically
and with reasonable costs thanks to the surge of CSR databases. In contrast,
CSR features that need to be processed more comprehensively on a case to
case basis, such as strategies, demand skilled expertise and come at a cost,
in particular when the focus is on small firms. One can argue that if there
is something value-relevant to be found, it is more likely to happen in areas
which are tougher to decipher. So any financial outperformance that lures
in these niches has to make up for the research costs that are associated with
this task. This suggests that one might keep encountering financial outper-
formance in market niches that are new and unfamiliar. On that notion,
our results suggest that strategic CSR for small and innovative firms seems
to evoke a market anomaly in terms of systematic outperformance that has
yet to be priced in by the market.
The mere growth of SRI assets as the second argument draws attention
to an overlooked dynamic in the existing CSR literature. Whenever investors
deviate from market weights, the ensuing rising demand can temporarily give
rise to abnormal returns due to stock market frictions. We present empirical
evidence to support this argument for Europe in the last decade. With an
increasingly saturated SRI market in the US, the ongoing SRI expansion in
Europe lends itself to be a more fertile ground for positive abnormal returns,
particularly with respect to small stocks. By and large, existing SRI research
has focused on big stocks. However, ever since Merton (1987), there is a
theoretical case for small stocks, and given our results, it seems worthwhile
to engage in future research with European SRI data to raise more evidence.
Notably for our portfolio, policy regulations could amplify abnormal returns.
For example, the extensive subsidies for renewable energies in Germany
could have distorted the allocation of SRI assets.
Our results are of high practical importance for both investors and a
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firm’s management. At first glance, it seems that investing in small and
innovative firms that focus on strategic sustainability kills two birds with one
stone. Socially responsible investing in strategic CSR can be quite lucrative,
at least on the revenue side. But this comes at a cost. On the expenditure
side, research costs have to be taken into account, costs that are likely to
be associated with expertise that gradually builds up over time. For the
management, our results may serve as important advice. If value-relevant
information is disclosed more transparently, the firm is more attractive to
the market. It falls to the management how this can be conveyed credibly.
It would be revealing to disentangle the two channels. In our case, a
longer time horizon might allow for a distinction of the two effects if we
were to observe how differently, if at all, the abnormal behavior evolves in
the long run. A convergence of future abnormal returns towards zero would
make for a case of errors of investors’ expectations. On the other hand, if
abnormal returns eventually turn negative, it would suggest that equilibrium
in the SRI investor share has been reached. Finally, if both abnormal and
absolute returns turn negative, we might observe a shrinking proportion of
SRI investors. One might label this situation as the burst of a financial SRI
bubble. Given the magnitude of our results, the two channels might well be
simultaneously at work. If anything, our data is only weakly indicative in
the sense that the lack of an observable negative trend of the alpha point
estimates in the rolling regression does not suggest a decreasing effect of SRI
growth. Analyzing according US data from the past two decades in light of
the slowing growth of SRI assets could shed more light on this question.
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A Tables & Figures
Table 1: No. of Innovators and Market Values
Average Market Value (Mio USD)
Year No. of Firms Innovators European Firms
2002 16 332 997
2003 17 595 1299
2004 13 396 1608
2005 17 777 1648
2006 30 1178 2074
2007 45 2288 2364
2008 75 645 1185
2009 77 875 1183
Table 2: No. of Innovators across Industries
Industries No. of Firms
Basic Materials 16
Consumer Goods 6
Consumer Services 1
Financials 12
Healthcare 3
Industrials 80
Oil & Gas 113
Technology 17
Utilities 42
Total 290
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Table 3: No. of Innovators across Subsectors
Subsectors No. of Firms
Alt. Electricity 32
Alternative Fuels 16
Auto Parts 4
Banks 8
Building Mat.& Fix. 15
Con. Electricity 7
Containers & Package 4
Dur. Household Prod. 4
Electrical Equipment 3
Electronic Equipment 3
Financial Admin. 7
Forestry 9
Healthcare Providers 2
Hotels 1
Industrial Machinery 31
Industrial Suppliers 1
Investment Services 4
Marine Transportation 1
Medical Equipment 1
Oil Equip. & Services 2
Renewable Energy Eq. 100
Semiconductors 4
Software 1
Specialty Chemicals 7
Telecom. Equipment 12
Waste, Disposal Svs. 8
Water 3
Total 290
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Table 4: No. of Innovators across Countries
Countries No. of Firms
Denmark 9
Finland 4
France 9
Germany 175
Greece 2
Italy 2
Netherlands 2
Norway 11
Spain 14
Sweden 2
Switzerland 26
United Kingdom 34
Total 290
Table 5: Average Monthly Returns over Time in %
rmt rft Innovatorst SMBt HMLt WMLt
1/2002 - 4/2009
0.3 0.31 0.74 0.41 0.55 1.12
(0.59) (0.01) (1.06) (0.24) (0.15) -0.45
1/2002 - 8/2005
1.37 0.23 1.4 0.8 1.05 1.08
(0.67) (0.00) (1.38) (0.31) (0.24) -0.68
9/2005 - 4/2009
-0.78 0.39 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.16
(0.95) (0.02) (1.63) (0.37) (0.14) -0.59
Average geometric returns are displayed and standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
Value weighted returns are presented for the market return rmt and the factors SMB,
HML, and WML. Equally weighted returns are displayed for the Innovator portfolio.
rft is the risk-free rate.
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates and Z-statistics in the Four-factor Model for
Different Time Periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
1.30** 1.51*** 0.35 -1.16** -0.07 0.61
(2.14) (10.94) (1.18) (-2.37) (-0.30)
01/2002- 08/2005
1.25 1.32*** 0.71** -1.48** -0.26 0.45
(1.14) (4.60) (2.04) (-2.12) (-0.75)
09/2005-04/2009
1.54 1.54*** 0.22 0.59 0.15 0.74
(1.66) (9.01) (0.66) (0.60) (0.56)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) signifi-
cance level, respectively. The parenthesis below the point estimates contain the z-statistic,
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
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Table 7: No. of Innovators and Control Firms across Countries (Country
Matched)
Industries No. of Innovators No. of Control Firms
Denmark 9 9
Finland 4 4
France 6 6
Germany 140 140
Italy 1 1
Netherlands 2 2
Norway 10 10
Spain 13 13
Sweden 2 2
Switzerland 23 23
United Kingdom 27 27
Total 237 237
Table 8: No. of Innovators and Control Firms across Industries (Country
Matched)
Industries No. of Innovators No. of Control Firms
Basic Materials 13 15
Consumer Goods 4 26
Consumer Services 1 35
Financials 10 50
Healthcare 3 16
Industrials 68 53
Oil & Gas 88 6
Technology 16 28
Telecommunications 0 4
Utilities 34 4
Total 237 237
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Table 9: Annual Means of Innovator (I), Control (C), and Market (M)
Portfolio Characteristics
Year
SIZE BEME MOM No. of Firms
I C M I C M I C M I C M
2002 859 917 1359 0.20 0.21 1.03 -5.81 -4.68 -3.69 10 10 4557
2003 471 526 1285 1.07 1.41 1.20 -6.29 -6.14 -1.37 14 14 4338
2004 285 123 1660 0.93 0.89 0.92 2.06 2.22 2.91 13 13 4235
2005 642 401 2103 0.76 0.59 0.81 1.74 2.70 1.69 15 15 4222
2006 693 597 2221 0.41 0.32 0.71 5.00 4.95 1.79 25 25 4257
2007 1220 1223 2702 0.40 0.42 0.68 1.70 1.24 1.94 31 31 4530
2008 2127 1854 3178 0.41 0.50 0.78 3.42 4.41 1.80 58 58 4343
2009 648 573 1451 1.25 1.41 1.96 -5.14 -5.28 -4.87 71 71 4556
The month December is used to calculate the means. Size stands for the market value of a firm and is
denominated in Mio USD.
Table 10: Add caption
Year
SIZE BEME MOM No. of Firms
I C M I C M I C M I C M
2002 460 465 75 0.14 0.18 0.68 -6.01 -4.34 -2.01 10 10 4557
2003 76 59 73 0.76 0.62 0.81 -7.50 -3.2 -0.30 14 14 4338
2004 78 66 107 0.76 0.79 0.64 1.83 1.99 2.77 13 13 4235
2005 126 91 140 0.53 0.48 0.57 1.69 2.80 1.82 15 15 4222
2006 244 234 146 0.26 0.28 0.47 4.96 4.31 1.75 25 25 4257
2007 345 339 177 0.29 0.38 0.45 2.01 1.89 2.00 31 31 4530
2008 545 610 204 0.25 0.38 0.46 4.23 3.84 1.76 58 58 4343
2009 190 201 76 0.64 0.78 1.04 -4.27 -4.88 -4.29 71 71 4556
The month December is used to calculate the means. Size stands for the market value of a firm and is
denominated in Mio USD.
Table 11: Mean Absolute Portfolio Difference as Compared to the Innovator
Portfolio over the Period 2001-2008
Mean Median
SIZE BEME MOM Size BEME MOM
Control Firms 120.38 0.12 0.50 20.13 0.08 1.13
Remaining Market 1126.75 0.33 1.66 144 0.21 2.25
In every year absolute differences are built between Control Firms and Innovators and the
Market and Innovators for Table 8 and 9. Then the mean over the years is calculated.
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Table 12: Average Monthly Returns over Time (Geometric Returns in Per-
cent)
rmt rft Innovatorst Control Firmst
1/2002 - 4/2009
0.3 0.31 0.47 0.21
(0.59) (0.01) (1.18) (0.81)
1/2002 - 8/2005
1.37 0.23 0.85 1.56
(0.67) (0.00) (1.34) (0.89)
/2005 - 4/2009
-0.78 0.39 0.09 -1.13
(0.95) (0.02) (1.96) (1.34)
Average geometric returns are displayed and standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
Value weighted returns are presented for the market return rmt and equally weighted
returns are displayed for the Innovator portfolio. rft is the risk-free rate.
Table 13: Exact Country Match: Parameter Estimates and Z-statistics in
the Four-factor Model for Different Time Periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
Innovators 1.34** 1.39*** 0.51 -1.12** -0.33 0.62
(2.17) (12.04) (1.52) (-2.43) (-1.53)
Control Firms -0.18 0.94*** 0.46** 0.25 -0.17 0.57
(-0.47) (8.82) (2.07) (0.64) (-0.77)
01/2002- 08/2005
Innovators 1.3 1.30*** 1.12** -1.61*** -0.53* 0.49
(1.03) (4.94) (2.12) (-2.74) (-1.74)
Control Firms 0.14 0.83*** 0.31 0.20 -0.19 0.27
(0.15) (5.10) (0.55) (0.36) (-0.52)
09/2005-04/2009
Innovators 1.32 1.38*** 0.27 1.01 -0.08 0.76
(1.49) (9.13) (0.88) (1.1) (-0.31)
Control Firms -0.15 0.96*** 0.51** 0.41 -0.18 0.78
(-0.31) (7.00) (2.54) (0.81) (-1.06)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) sig-
nificance level, respectively. The parentheses below the point estimates contain the z-
statistics, corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
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Table 14: Exact Industry Match: Parameter Estimates and Z-statistics in
the Four-factor Model for Different Time Periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
Innovators 1.37** 1.40*** 0.52 -1.12** -0.32 0.62
(2.21) (12.25) (1.51) (-2.41) (-1.49)
Control Firms 0.78 1.08*** 0.61** 0.47 -0.46** 0.65
(1.36) (10.3) (2.56) (0.74) (-2.07)
01/2002- 08/2005
Innovators 1.43 1.31*** 1.10** -1.63*** -0.52* 0.5
(1.13) (5.06) (2.09) (-2.77) (-1.73)
Control Firms 0.92 0.96*** 0.78 0.56 -0.80*** 0.5
(0.84) (4.45) (1.10) (0.72) (-3.07)
09/2005-04/2009
Innovators 1.27 1.37*** 0.29 1.10 -0.06 0.76
(1.42) (8.86) (0.87) (1.11) (-0.25)
Control Firms 0.44 1.16*** 0.45** 1.02 -0.00 0.78
(0.66) (7.27) (2.39) (1.51) (-0.01)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) sig-
nificance level, respectively. The parentheses below the point estimates contain the z-
statistics, corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
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Table 15: Exact Country-Industry Match: Parameter Estimates and Z-
statistics in the Four-factor Model for Different Time Periods
α rmt – rit SMBt HMLt WMLt R
2
01/2002-04/2009
Innovators 1.09* 1.28*** 0.55* -1.08*** -0.39** 0.62
(1.75) (12.30) (1.94) (-2.82) (-2.06)
Control Firms 0.08 1.00*** 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.57
(0.14) (8.12) (0.88) (0.41) (0.40)
01/2002- 08/2005
Innovators 0.82 1.32*** 1.03* -1.41** -0.52* 0.48
(0.65) (4.90) (1.94) (-2.66) (-1.80)
Control Firms 0.69 0.84*** 0.58 -0.23 -0.10 0.29
(0.79) (3.62) (1.56) (-0.61) (-0.54)
09/2005-04/2009
Innovators 1.03 1.22*** 0.42 0.78 -0.18 0.77
(1.23) (8.81) (1.50) (0.97) (-0.89)
Control Firms -0.23 1.04*** -0.04 1.01 0.24 0.72
(-0.32) (6.49) (-0.17) (1.48) (1.00)
* (**, ***) means that the parameter is different from zero at the 10% (5%, 1%) sig-
nificance level, respectively. The parentheses below the point estimates contain the z-
statistics, corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to three lags.
Table 16: Alpha (α) Distribution of Random Samples of Innovator and
Control Firms for the Period 01/2002-04/2009
α
Matching Characteristics Portfoliotype mean p5 p50 p95
Size, BEME, MOM Innovators 1.42 0.79 1.42 2.06
Control Firms 0.16 -0.44 0.17 0.79
Size, BEME, MOM, Country
Innovators 1.47 0.83 1.49 2.07
Control Firms 0.29 -0.31 0.29 0.92
Size, BEME, MOM, Sector
Innovators 1.49 0.88 1.50 2.1
Control Firms 0.31 -0.33 0.31 0.99
Size, BEME, MOM, Country, Sector
Innovators 0.99 0.42 0.99 1.53
Control Firms 0.23 -0.39 0.23 0.84
p5, p50, and p95 are the 5%, 50%, and 95% percentiles, respectively
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